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SUPREME COURT-STATE OF NEW YORK NYSOfflC[ (!fTHEATIORNEYGENERAl 
IAS PART-ORANGE COUNTY JAN 1 7 2013 
Present; HON. CATHERINE M. BARTLETT, A.J.S.C. r :•rfis & LITIGATION 
SUPREME COURT: STATE OF NEW YORK 
COUNTY OF OR.ANGE 
----------------------~-------------------------------------------x 
WILLIAMS. KENNEDY, 
Petitioner, 
-against-
THE NEW YORK STA TE DIVISION OF PAROLE, 
Respondent. 
---------------------~---------------------------------------------x 
~ . - )il<Ef PSIE OFFICE 
To commence the statutory time 
period for appeals as of right 
(CPLR 5513 [a]), you are 
advised to serve a copy of this 
order, with notice of entry, 
upon all parties. 
Index No. 9588/2012 
Motion Date: December 28, 2012 
The following papers numbered l to 7 were read on this petition for a CPLR Article 78 
proceeding seeking to vacate the January 31, 2012 decision denying parole for petitioner and 
ordering a de novo parole hearing before a newly constituted parole board and for poor person 
status: 
Order to Show Cause-Petition-Affidavit-Exhibits ...................... .. , ...... ... . I-..; 
Answer-Exhibits ... . . .. . ...... ... .. . ........ . .......... . . ...... . .. . . .... . ... 5-6 
Affirmation in Response . ....................... ........... . ... . . . . . ............ 7 
Upon the foregoing papers it is ORDERED that the petition is disposed of as follows: 
Petitioner seeks an order pursuant to CPLR § 7804 vacating the New York State Parole 
Board's (hereinafter "the Board'') January 31 , 2012 decision denying petitioner parole, and 
further seeks a de nova parole board hearing before a newly constituted board. 
Petitioner contends that the Board failed to utilize a risk and needs assessment as 
amended in Executive Law§ 259(c)(4) which became effective on October 1, 2011. While it is 
true that there was no formal COMP AS Risk Assessment prepared in this case, the fact remains 
that the Board considered the very things which the Risk Assessment called for, namely the 
inmate status report, instit11tional record, the personal interview wit)1 petitioner, and steps taken 
toward rehabilitation and the petitioner's likelihood of success if released . Therefore, petitioner's 
lacks merit. 
Petitioner next claims that the Board failed to take into account all of the required factors 
in determining whether a parole applicant should be granted parole. Essentially, petitioner claims 
that the Board considered only two of the factors, namely the petitioner's criminal record and 
nature of the crime involved, as the basis for denying him parole. Petitioner claims that the 
Board's rationale was not given in.detail and that it was given in conclusory terms in violation of 
the law. 
Respondent contends that the Board's decision was based upon all of the statutory factors 
despite one being given more weight t~an the others. Respondent contends that there is a 
presumption of propriety which attaches to administrative proceedings such as the instant parole 
hearing, and thnt petitioner has not met its heavy burden of demonstrating that the Board's 
decision bordered on impropriety. 
New York Executive Law§ 259-i(2)(c)(A) requires the Board to have considered the 
following eight (8) factors in determining the propriety of granting parole to the petitioner: 
(i) the institutional record including program goals and accomplishments, 
academic achievements, vocational education, training or work assignments, 
therapy and interpersonal relationships with staff and inmates; (ii) performance, if 
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any, as a participant in a temporary release program; (iii) release plans including 
community resources, employment, education and training and support services 
available to the inmate; (iv) any deportation order issued by the federa l 
government against the inmate while in the custody of the department of 
correctional services and any recommendation regarding deportation made by the 
commissioner of the department of correctional services pursuant to section one 
hundred forty-seven of the correction law; (v) any statement made to the board by 
the crime victim or the victim's representative, where the crime victim is deceased 
or is mentally or physically incapacitated; (vi) the length of the determinate 
sentence to which the inmate would be subject had he or she received a sentence 
pursuant to section 70.70 or section 70. 71 of the penal law for a felony defined in 
article two hundred twenty or article two hundred twenty-one of the penal law; 
(vii) the seriousness of the offense with due consideration to the type of sentence, 
length of sentence and recommendations of the sentencing court, the district 
attorney, the attorney for the inmate, the presentence probation report as well as 
consideration of any mitigating and aggravating factors, and activities following 
arrest prior to confinement; and (viii) prior criminal record, including the nature 
and pattern of offenses, adjustment to any previous probation or parole 
supervision and institutional confinement. 
Petitioner bears the threshold burden of establishing that the Board acted irrationally, bordering 
upon impropriety, in denying petitioner's application to be released on parole. See, Samuel v 
Alexander, 69 AD3d 861 (2"d Dept. 2010). As expressed by the Comi of Appeals, the function of 
a parole board is deemed a judicial one, and will not be reviewable if performed according to the 
law. See, Briguglio v New York State Board of Parole, 24 NY2d 21, 29 (1969). Jn other words, 
as long as the parole board does not affirmatively violate a statutory requirement, it has absolute 
discretion in making its determinations and such determinations are not rcviewable by the courts. 
See, Id. 
In making its determinations, the Board was not required to give equal weight to the 
statutory factors outlined in Executive Law§ 259-i(2)(c)(A), nor was it required to address each 
one of the factors in reaching its decision. See, Samuel, 69 AD3d at 861; Alamo v New York State 
Division of Parole, 52 AD3d 1163, 1163-1164 (3'd Dept. 2008); Ward v New York State Division 
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<~(Parole, 26 AD3d 712. 713 (3ru Dept. 2006). ln fact, the Board was entitled to emphasize one 
of the factors more than the others in reaching its determination, specifically, the disturbing 
nature of the crimes themselves. See. Karlin v Alexander, 57 AD3d 1156, (3'!1 Dept. 2008); 
Alamo, 52 ADJd at 1163. 
In the instant case, the minutes of the Board indicate not oi1ly that it considered the 
serious nature of the crime of which petitioner was convicted, but petitioner's institutional record 
(Respondent's Exhibit 4, pp. 6-7), petitioner's post-release plans (Respo11dent's Exhibit 4, p. 7), 
and his institutional accomplishments (Respondent's Exhibit 4, pp. 7-8). The Board also stated 
that there was a reasonable probability that petitioner would be incompatible with the safety and 
welfare of the community at large and deprecate the serious nature of the crime at issue which 
was the murder of strangling of a man during a home invasion and the tying up of his wife during 
that robbery'. So long as the Board considered the relevant statutory factors and did not consider 
only one to the exclusion of the others, the Board cannot be considered to have acted irrationally 
bordering upon impropriety. See, Samuel, 69 AD3d at 861. In this case, the Board's emphasis on 
the serious nature of the offense, in conjunction with the record before this Com1 of the other 
relevant statutory considerations it was required to facto r info its decis~on, does not, in and of 
itself. render its decision improper. See, LaSalle l' New York State Division of Parole, 69 AD3d 
I 252, 1253 (3'd Dept. 20 I 0). In fact, the Board does not even have to specifically discuss all of 
the factors it considered, nor was it required to give them equal weight. See, Id.; Young v New 
York State Division of Parole, 74 AD3d 168 J (3rd Dept. 20 IO); Alamo, 52 AD3d at J 163-1164; 
Ward, 26 AD3d at 713. The record reveals that in denying petitioner's application for parole 
release, the Board considered all relevant factors, including the gravity of petitioner's instant 
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offense (see, Executive Law§ 259-i[2)[c); Matter of Rhoden v New York State Div. of Parole. 
270 AD2d 550). 
Thus, the petitioner failed to meet his burden of establishing his allegations of irrational 
conduct by the Board bordering upon its impropriety in denying petitioner's application for 
parole. Petitioner's remaining contentions are equally unavailing. Petitioner's petition is 
therefore denied in its entirety. 
Additionally, $50.00 shall be deducted from the petitioner's inmate account for the 
reduced filing fee in this matter in accordance with the order signed coterminously herewith. 
The foregoing constitutes the decision and order of the court. 
~ated: January q, 2013 
Goshen,ltw York 
ENTER 
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HON. CATHERINE M. BARTLETT, 
A.J.S.C. 
JUDGE NY STATE COURT OF CLAIMS 
ACTING SUPREME COURT JUSTICE 
